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Abstract 
                                                                                                                                               .                                 
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising 
from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of 
Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. 
This paper investigates the determinants of moral hazard among JLL schemes from Malawi, 
using group level data from 99 farm and non-farm credit groups. Results reveal that peer 
selection, peer monitoring, peer pressure, dynamic incentives and variables capturing the 
extent of matching problems explain most of the variation in the incidence of moral hazard 
among  credit  groups.  The  implications  are  that  Joint  Liability  Lending  institutions  will 
continue to rely on social cohesion and dynamic incentives as a means to enhancing their 
performance which has a direct implication on their outreach, impact and sustainability. 
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1.0  Introduction 
Imperfect  information  causes  at  least  four  problems  in  credit  markets,  namely, 
adverse  selection,  moral  hazard,  lack  of  insurance  and  lack  of  enforcement.  It  is  now 
common knowledge that, moral hazard, coupled with the lack of collateral by the poor is the 
key reason why credit markets fail for them.  The problem of moral hazard may arise when 
individuals engage in risk sharing under conditions such that their privately taken actions 
affect the probability distribution of the outcome. It occurs in a principal-agent relationship 
when actions taken by an agent are not pareto-optimal.  
Joint Liability Lending (JLL) is celebrated as a contractual innovation that has achieved 
the apparent miracle of enabling previously marginalized borrowers to lift themselves up by 
their own bootstraps by creating ´social collateral’ to replace the missing physical collateral   3 
that  excluded  them  from  access  to  more  traditional  forms  of  finance  (Conning  2000). 
Nevertheless, the problem with joint liability lending programs is that the poor are given 
access to credit without collateral, and in the event of default, they can not be punished 
beyond a mere denial of future access to credit. This form of limited liability can induce 
borrowers to take risky decisions.   
  Among the most notable theories of moral hazard are models by Stiglitz (1990) and 
Ghatak and Guinane (1999).  Stiglitz shows how peer monitoring under joint liability lending 
can be used to mitigate moral hazard.  Through JLL, it is assumed that group members, who 
are jointly liable to the loan, will be induced to monitor each other’s investment decisions 
and  effort,  thereby,  reducing  the  cost  of  monitoring  by  the  lending  institution  and 
consequently mitigating moral hazard. Thus, borrowers are given tasks of both managing 
their loan, and monitoring peers to ensure that they take safe decisions that would protect 
them from falling into repayment problems. However, in reality, monitoring can be costly 
and thus the assumption made by Stiglitz can not hold.  
As a diversion from a model by Stiglitz, Ghatak and Guinane (1999), propose a modification 
on  the  assumptions  of  costless  monitoring,  by  showing  that  peer  monitoring  is  costly. 
Further, they show the condition under which optimal contracts can still be achieved taking 
into account the cost of monitoring. They also add that a borrower’s willingness to repay the 
loan will depend on how they value the access to further loans from the same institution. 
Ghatak and Guinane observe that if a borrower’s project yields enough output  so that he/she 
is able to repay the loan, he/she will do it only if the benefit of defaulting, the interest, is less 
than the (discounted) net benefit of continued access to credit.  This raises the question: `to 
what extent does the value of future access to credit reduce the incidence of moral hazard?  
Following the proposed theories of moral hazard, only a limited number of empirical studies 
have been conducted to test their validity.   4 
In Malawi Moral hazard is common occurrence among credit groups. Diagne et al 
(2000) note that peer monitoring rarely occurs in credit groups from Malawi and that when it 
occurs it does not lead to improvements in repayment because the main reason for default in 
the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC) credit groups is the unwillingness to repay 
(moral hazard) and not the inability to repay. The unwillingness to repay was found to be the 
first cause of default among the MRFC credit groups. It accounted for 25 percent of all 
defaults in MRFC credit groups. However, no study has been conducted in Malawi to assess 
the driving forces behind such high incidences of moral hazard. Thus, the objective of this 
paper is to examine the extent to which moral hazard occurs in credit groups and analyse 
determinants of the likelihood of its occurrence. It is an attempt to contribute to moral hazard 
literature by testing the extent to which peer selection, peer monitoring, social ties, peer 
pressure,  dynamic  incentives  and  matching  problems  influence  the  incidence  of    moral 
hazard.  We  adopt  a  theoretical  framework  proposed  by  Ghatak  and  Guinane(1999)  with 
some extensions proposed by Diagne (1998) and Paxton (1996). We use data from Malawi, 
collected  by  the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute  (IFPRI)  in  2000.  The  data 
comes from 99 credit groups, all of which are beneficiaries of the Malawi Rural Finance 
Company’s (MRFC) farm and non-farm loans.  In section 2 we present a brief review of 
literature. The theoretical and empirical framework is presented in section 3.  In section 4 we 
present and discuss results, while section 5 concludes.    
2.0  Moral hazard in group based credit: a review of related research 
A very limited number of empirical studies have been conducted on determinants of 
moral hazard in JLL schemes. Among the few attempts are studies by Wydick (1999) and 
Hermes et al (2005). Wydick assesses the incidence of moral hazard among credit groups in 
Guatemala and provides evidence that joint liability works because of social cohesion and 
better information flow. Nevertheless, the study fails to assess the extent to which other key   5 
variables of group dynamics such as, dynamic incentives, sanctions and matching problems 
influence the incidence of moral hazard. Hermes et al (2005) study the incidence of moral 
hazard among credit groups from Eritrea and observe that social ties and peer monitoring are 
key factors influencing the likelihood of moral hazard among borrowers.  
The role of peer selection in mitigating adverse selection and hence moral hazard is 
discussed  by  Ghatak  (1999).  Ghatak  argues  that  despite  information  asymmetry,  joint 
liability lending allows for pareto superior equilibrium in credit markets if group formation is 
conducted appropriately. Ghatak shows how groups formed through self selection will result 
into members with homogenous quality. Ghatak shows that through the assortative matching 
process, groups end up with less risk borrowers, directly reducing moral hazard, which leads 
to a lower equilibrium interest rate leading to a Pareto-superior outcome relative to individual 
lending.  
The  significance  of  peer  monitoring  in  improving  repayments  in  group  credit  is 
highlighted by a number of authors. Stiglitz (1990), for example, observes that the major 
problem facing MFIs is ensuring that borrowers exercise prudence in the use of the funds so 
that the likelihood of repayments is enhanced. Stiglitz notes that a partial solution to this 
problem  is  peer  monitoring:  giving  neighbours  or  group  members  the  responsibility  to 
monitor each other. The incentive for peer monitoring comes from the fact that peers are 
supposed to pay loans for any defaulting group members. Studying the incentive rationale for 
the use of group lending as a method of financing liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs, Che 
(2002) observes that the joint liability lowers the liquidity risk of default but creates a free-
riding problem. Che points out that in the static setting, the free-riding problem dominates the 
liquidity risk effect, thus making group lending unattractive. However, when the projects are 
repeated over time, the joint liability feature provides the group members with a credible   6 
means of exercising peer monitoring and sanctioning, which can make the group lending 
attractive, relative to individual lending.  
In contrast to the emphasis on peer monitoring,  Fuglesgang et al., (1993)  argue that 
the monitoring by lending institutions is all that matters most when it comes to improving 
repayment rates. They observe that even micro lenders that are famous for the joint liability 
methodology such as the Grameen of Bangladesh do in fact also rely heavily upon highly 
motivated and locally recruited loan staff officers as monitors and organizers. Following this 
observation, Conning (2000) questions whether such delegated monitors might not be just as 
good at monitoring, and perhaps better at enforcing loan repayment than peer monitors, in 
which case joint liability clauses my be superfluous or may be serving other purposes.  
The role of peer pressure is discussed by Diagne (1998). Diagne proposes a peer 
pressure  model  in  which  borrowers  are  incompletely  informed  about  their  partners 
willingness to apply or tolerate social sanctions and shows how peer pressure can be used to 
mitigate  default  in  situations  where  potential  defaulters  are  intolerant  of  sanctions.  An 
extension of the model by Diagne (1998) and Paxton (1996) further proposes the importance 
of   dynamic incentives and incentive match in inducing safe behaviour among borrowers.  
The role of sanctions in enhancing the willingness of individuals to repay their loans 
is also discussed in Besley and Coate (1995). They show how moderately successful group 
members may wilfully decide not to repay their loans because of the burden of having to 
repay the unsuccessful members´ loan.  They note however, that in the presence of strong 
social ties among group members, wilful default is minimized because potential defaulters 
are afraid of facing sanctions from both the bank and the community. Ahlin and Townsend 
(2003) further attempt to modify existing models on repayment and moral hazard by testing 
some unexamined dimensions of the models. One such test is the introduction of productivity 
differences  across  groups.  Based  on  the  assumption  that  the  production  function  can  be   7 
decomposed multiplicatively into a piece related to the risk factor and a piece related to 
productive inputs, such as loaned capital and human capital, they assign the derivative of the 
utility difference with respect to human capital. In their empirical analysis they find that 
productivity represented by the average level of education positively influences repayment. 
However  the  average  land  holding  size  (another  productivity  variable  considered  in  the 
model) had no impact on repayment performance. In the next section we present a theoretical 
framework on moral hazard and its extensions.   
3.0  Theoretical and empirical framework 
Following Salanie (2000), the standard moral hazard model assumes that the principal cannot 
directly observe the effort level of the agent. Once a contract has been signed the agent must 
choose  between  n  possible  actions  n i a a ., ,......... .These  actions  produce  one  among  m 
outcomes  which  we  may  denote  m x x ........, ,......... 1 .  Assume  further  that  when  the  agent 
chooses  action  i a ,  the  Principal  observes  the  outcome  j x with  a  probability  ij p   that  is 
positive. The agent receives a wage j w  when the Principal observes the outcome  j x .  The 
income  for  the  principal  is  ( j j w x − ).  The  specification  for  the  Agent’s  von  Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function can be written as: 
a w u − ) (  ,  where u    is increasing and concave. Assuming neutrality for the principal as in 
most of the literature, his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is written as 
w x −  . When the Principal offers a contract  j w  the agent’s utility maximization problem can 
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where k=1, …..n and  i k ≠ . 
The  agents’  utility  maximization  problem  is  also  subject  to  the  following  (individual 
rationality constraint) participation constraint: 
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where  µ  is the utility derived from taking an outside option. Building on the basic principles 
stated in the standard model specified above, Stiglitz (1990) proposes a moral hazard model 
for credit markets which can be presented in two stages. First the model is presented under 
individual lending and then later a scenario under group lending is presented. The model 
shows that joint liability lending can be used to mitigate the moral hazard problem among 
group members.  The model starts by assuming a single borrowers´ loan (individual liability) 
under the assumption that borrowers are risk neutral. Output takes two values, high 
H Y  and 
low 
L Y . Normalizing the low output values to 0, the output is high with probability  p  and 0 
otherwise. Assuming that each projects requires 1 unit of capital, then the repayment to the 
lender plus interest equals  1 > ρ . Borrowers will only be willing to borrow if the utility from 
borrowing (which results from the payoffs) is no smaller than some utility  µ that represents 
the utility the agent can obtain by taking on an outside option. This participation constraint, 
which also implies that the projects are socially profitable, can be expressed as follows: 
  µ ρ ≥ −
H pY  
Borrowers choose actions, which can be thought of as a level of effort  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ p , for which 




p γ  (where  γ  >0). Following this specification a social   9 
surplus and the equilibrium p which is subject to moral hazard can be computed. Under 
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Under joint liability scenario it is assumed that when a borrower’s project fails the partner is 
liable for the amount q. This is an incentive for each member to care about the safety of the 
project chosen by the peers and it is acknowledged as a justification for peer monitoring.  If 
one of the members  chooses an action   ´ p  then the payoff function of a borrower who 




´) 1 ( max
2
) (
p p qp rp pY
H
p
γ − − − −  
Assume that the borrower chooses action  p to maximize his individual payoff, taking his 
partner’s action  ' p  as given. Then her best response function is given by: 
'. p







At the equilibrium the  p under joint liability just like under individual liability has two 
values  while  the  denominator  of  the  joint  liability  expression  is  lower  than  that  of  the 
individual liability. The model shows how the equilibrium value of  p  and hence repayment 
rate is higher under joint liability compared to individual lending. 
The model outlined above assumes that members can monitor each others actions 
perfectly at no cost, as well as they enforce any agreements regarding their choice of p. 
However, in reality, peer monitoring can be costly. In addition, joint liability lending allows 
for the imposition of sanctions on group members that renege their repayment promises. 
Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) therefore, make an extension of this model by including the 
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cost of monitoring and considerations for the impact of sanctions in choosing the level of p
5. 
Diagne (1998) further make extensions to the model by including the impact peer pressure 
and dynamic incentives in inducing repayment.  Ahlin and Townsend (2003) propose the 
inclusion of productivity differences across groups and show how high productivity leads to 
a reduction in moral hazard through an increase in payoffs for safe projects.  
Following the theoretical framework stated above, the empirical strategy focuses on 
testing whether or not particular covariates, vector X=(X1………..Xn) are associated with the 
incidence of moral hazard. The probability of moral hazard in a specific group g as a function 
of covariates can be written as P(H
g =1 | X
g ). This leads to the following likelihood function: 
 Џ
G P(H
g = 1 | X
g )
Hg [1 –P(H




The moral hazard model P(H
g =1 | X
g ) can thus be written as a function P(B´ X
g ), where    B 
is an Mx1 vector of parameters and X
g is an Mx1 vector containing group g´s values for the 
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Where: 
  1 x ´s are a set of variables (Pr=2) that measure group productivity 
2 x ´s are a set of variables (Scr=4) that measure the quality of screening 
3 x ´s are a set of variables (pm=3) that measure the quality of peer monitoring 
4 x ´s are a set of variables (St=6) that measure the strength of social ties within the group 
5 x ´s are a set of variables (Pp=2) that measure the quality of peer pressure 
6 x ´s are a set of variables (Dinc=2) that measure the quality of dynamic incentives 
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7 x ´s are a set of variables (Im=3) that the proxy the degree of incentive match 
8 x ´s are a set of variables (Ctr=5) that are control variables  
The study is based on data collected by the  International Food Policy  Research  Institute 
(IFPRI) in 2000 form 99 credit groups of the Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC). The 
data  was  collected  using  a  structured  questionnaire  administered  to  a  group  leader.  The 
incidence of moral hazard in each credit group was captured by asking the chairperson of 
each  group  about  whether  some  members  had  defaulted  wilfully,  or  whether  they  had 
misused loan funds that were meant for an investment. Explanatory variables in the model 
are described in detail in Table1.  
4.0  Empirical results and discussion 
The maximum likelihood probit estimates of the above moral hazard equation are 
presented in Table 2. In line with a priori expectations, results indicate that groups formed 
through  peer  selection  have  a  lower  incidence  of  moral  hazard.  This  implies  that  peer 
selection  enables  group  to  screen  risky  borrowers  which  in  concurrence  with    Ghatak’s 
theory of adverse selection. Ghatak (1999) observes that self selection process leads to the 
emergence of a pool of safe borrowers which can lead to a reduction in the likelihood of 
moral hazard. Both peer monitoring variables are significant and their signs conform to the a 
priori expectations.  First the proportion of group members reporting that they do not know 
the composition of the group has a positive and significant coefficient. This signifies the non-
occurrence of monitoring in some groups, which increases the likelihood of moral hazard. 
The presence of individuals with joint enterprises has a reducing effect on the incidence of 
moral hazard. This conforms to a priori expectations that moral hazard is less likely in groups 
with joint enterprises because members are more likely to monitor each other’s investment 
decisions and the levels of output.  Only one of the variables measuring levels of social ties ,   12 
the number of villages  from which  group members come is significant, with an  a priori 
expected sign. As a spatial variable, this implies that groups with members from villages that 
are further apart face difficulties in peer monitoring. Secondly, the members from different 
villages are less likely to exhibit strong pre-existing social ties, such that they may not know 
each other well which would lead to the inclusion of risky borrowers within the group.  
The presence of peer pressure has a significant and negative impact on the incidence 
of  moral  hazard.  This  is  in  conformation  to  our  a  priori  expectation.  This  finding  also 
conforms to the finding by Wydick (1999), in which he observes that the willingness to apply 
peer pressure has a significant effect on reducing moral hazard within borrowing groups from 
Guatemala.  The  presence  of  social  sanctions  returned  a  conflicting  sign  and  but  it  is 
insignificant. 
The dynamic incentives captured by the willingness to pay a full value of defaulted 
loans, which is also a measure of the willingness to accept full joint liability is negative and 
significant. The implication is that the full joint liability clause is a key mechanism through 
which the incidence of moral hazard can be minimized. The variable capturing the preference 
for  limited  liability  where  individuals  are  only  required  to  pay  10  percent  penalty  is 
insignificant. The findings are consistent with a priori expectations in that full joint liability 
strengthens togetherness in the group which makes it less likely that individuals would want 
to harm each other through default. The presence of members from past failed programs in a 
group has a significant and positive coefficient. This conforms to a priori expectations that 
members that have ever participated in previously failed credit programs where loans were 
not rigorously collected have a tendency to take risky actions that have a negative impact on 
repayment. In the same context, Buckley (1996) discusses the abandonment of offers in joint 
liability  lending  programs.  Buckley  notes  that  a  problem  arises  with  JLLIs  in  that  the 
institution sometimes keeps the group but abandons the joint liability which is the pillar of   13 
group  lending.  Buckley  likens  the  situation  to  the  abandonment  of  joint  liability  in 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA) in Malawi. He notes that at first 
SACA lent to individuals under joint liability and the repayment was good. However, in 1992 
SACA adopted a policy of allowing any individual that had repaid his or her own loan to 
access further credit even if one or more of the borrowers in his/her group was in default. 
This led to a severe drop in repayment rates. Both variable capturing mismatching problems 
conform to a priori expectations by returning positive and significant coefficients. First, the 
presence of new members in a group is likely to introduce a matching problem as the loan 
demand for new members may not match those of old members due to differences in the 
levels of business skills. This in turn makes it difficult for the lending institutions meet the 
loan demand for such a diverse group of individuals leading an erosion of incentives for 
repayment  among  members  whose  loan  supply  does  not  create  the  incentive  to  repay. 
Second, the variable that measures the age of a group has a positive effect on moral hazard. 
Again this is related to the matching problem in loan cycles proposed by Paxton (1996). In 
the  first  meeting  every  one  agrees  to  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  loan.  However  as 
members continue to receive loans from a lending institution, they develop skills at different 
levels. This leads to a diversity in their loan requirements which in turn makes it difficult for 
the  lender  to  match  the  demand  and  supply  of  credit  among  group  members.  As  more 
members become unsatisfied, the incentive for repayment declines leading to moral hazard. 
Both  productivity  variables  had  no  significant  impact  on  the  incidence  of  moral  hazard, 
although  they  returned  expected  signs.  The  maximum  loan  size  available  to  the  group 
increases the likelihood of moral hazard. This is consistent with theoretical proposition by 
Stiglitz(1990) in which it is observed that the expected utility of risky projects increases 
faster in loaned funds than that of a safe project. This assumes that an increase in the loan   14 
size  increases  the  relative  attractiveness  of  risky  projects  leading  to  moral  hazard.  Other 
control variables such as group size and program dummies were insignificant.  
5.0  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The  main  aim  of  this  study  is  to  examine  the  incidence  of  moral  hazard  and 
investigate factors that explain the variation in its occurrence among credit groups. The paper 
has  examined  a  wide  range  of  factors  related  to  group  dynamics  and  assessed  their 
relationship  with  the  occurrence  of  moral  hazard  among  credit  groups.  We  note  that  in 
Malawi, despite the high potential of joint liability lending in mitigating moral hazard, the 
mechanism is still prone to moral hazard. About 40 percent of the credit groups reported that 
they experienced misuse of funds by some of their group members.  Our analysis shows that 
peer selection, peer monitoring, peer pressure and social ties reduce the likelihood of the 
incidence of moral hazard. These findings offer support to theoretical propositions by Ghatak 
and Guinane (1999) and Diagne (1998).  Indicating the significance of the matching problem, 
results show that the number of new members in a group and the number of loan cycles lead 
to a rise in the incidence of moral hazard. This finding is consistent with the proposition by 
Paxton (1996). Normally, new members join the group because either some old members are 
excluded from the group for non-compliance, or they left wilfully. In microfinance literature, 
the number of dropouts from the program is a strong indicator of whether or not the financial 
services needs for the beneficiaries are being met. To reduce the problem of high dropouts 
which  leads  to  replacements  by  new  members,  microfinance  institutions  require  constant 
appraisals of their activities to ensure that they address the needs of their clientele.  
With regards to dynamic incentives, model results show that the full joint liability as 
captured in the willingness of group members to pay a full amount of defaulter’s loan has 
great potential as lending technology that can be used to minimize the incidence of moral 
hazard. The limited liability, chosen by those that are only willing to pay a 10 percent penalty   15 
for  default  works  against  repayment  in  that  it  increases  the  incidence  of  moral  hazard.  
Results reveal that while paying attention to dynamic incentives and matching problems  peer 
selection  must  be  enhanced  at  group  formation  to  reduce  problems  of  adverse  selection, 
which may arise when outsiders such as credit officers are given the mandate to create credit 
groups.  Considering  the  significance  of  peer  monitoring,  peer  pressure  and  social  ties in 
mitigating moral hazard, joint liability lending institutions must continue relying on social 
cohesion in order to simultaneously address problems of low outreach, limited impact and 
lack of financial self sustainability. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variables  Description  Mean    S.D 
Productivity       
AVGLAND  Average land holding of group members in hectares  3.17  1.471 
EDUCATION  Average years of formal education of group members  4.72  1.533 
Screening       
SCREEN  Whether some individuals who wanted to join the group rejected  0.439   0.490 
FASCREEN  Group was formed by the Agricultural extension worker (1=yes, 0=no)  0.46   0.499 
PEERSELECT  Whether group was initiated by peers (1=yes, 0=no)   0.241  0.428 
VHSCREEN  Group was formed by the Village headman (1=yes, 0=no)  0.12   0.321 
Peer monitoring       
JOINTENTERP  Members have joint enterprises (1=have joint enterprises)    0.6   0.533 
GCOMPNAI  Percentage of group members not knowing group composition  0.066  0.147 
GLONCNAI  Percentage of member not knowing loan characteristics       
Social ties       
COWEALTHOMO  An index of wealth heterogeneity (1=Group is homogenous)  0.14  0.343 
VILLAGENUMBER  Number of villages from which members come  2.76  2.039 
PMFAMVG  At least one member is from the family of a village headman (1=yes)   0.82  0.383 
POLITCLAN  Number of members from the clan of a politician  0.61  1.083 
CHAIRFAMILY  Number of members from the family of club chair person  1.50  3.012 
GENDERHOMO  Whether gender composition of the group is mixed (1=yes, 0=no)  0.57  0.496   17 
Peer pressure       
PRESUDUEDATE  Whether group exerted pressure before due date (1=yes)  0.14  0.349 
LEFEXCMG  Number of members that  were excluded from group (sanctions)  0.27  1.080 
Dynamic Incentives           
CONTRIBPAY  Whether would be willing to pay full cost of defaulters loan (1=yes, 0=no)  0.46  0.500 
PAYPENATY  Would only be willing to pay ten percent penalty  0.37  0.485 
PAST SACA  At least one member was from past failed credit programs (1=yes, 0=no)   0.78  0.415 
Incentive Match       
NEWMMBAVG  Number of new members in the group  1.41  2.732 
LONCYCLE  The loan cycle for which loan was received (1-5)  2.74  1.051 
Control  Variables       
GPSIZE  Number of members at the start of the season in a credit group  16.84  5.563 
CREDLIMIT  Average Credit limit in a group per individual  4642.38  3822.1 
MAIZE  Dummy for maize credit group (1=maize, 0=otherwise)  0.19  0.393 
COTTON  Dummy for cotton credit group (1=maize,0=otherwise)  0.042  0.201 
NON-FARM  Dummy for non-farm credit group (1=maize 0=otherwise)  0.30  0.462 
Source: Own calculation from IFPRI/RDD survey 1999 
 
 
Table 2: Determinants of   Moral hazard-Maximum likelihood Probit estimates 
 
Variable  Measure  Coeff.  Z-statistic 
Productivity        Average land holding  Number of hectares  -0.215  -1.54 
       Average years of education  Years of education  -0.201  -1.31 
Screening            Evidence of screening  Dummy  -0.042  -0.11 
       Groups formed by extension officer  Dummy  -0.319  -0.63 
       Groups formed by self selection  Dummy  -0.838*  -1.66 
       Groups formed by village chief  Dummy  -0.311  -0.5 
Peer monitoring Have Joint enterprises  Dummy  -0.608*  -1.87 
Don’t Know group composition  % of total members  3.266*  1.77 
Social ties           Number of villages members    Number of villages  0.377***  3.39 
Members related to Chief   Dummy  -0.251  -0.58 
Members related to group chair  Number of people  -0.046  -0.77 
Peer pressure      Peer pressure  Dummy  -1.025**  -2.02 
Sanctions  Number sanctioned  0.279  1.3 
Dynamic incentive Pay full joint liability  Dummy  -1.311**  -2.36 
Pay 10 percent penalty  Dummy  -0.265  -0.5 
Member from failed programs(SACA)  Dummy  1.200**  2.25 
Matching problem (incentive match)       
New members    Number of members  0.306***  3.23 
Loan cycle  Number of cycles  0.478**  2.51 
Control              Group size  Number of members  0.025  0.68 
                            Loan size  Amount in MK  0.001**  2.0 
                            Maize group  Dummy  -0.694  -1.08 
                            Cotton group  Dummy  -0.654  -1 
                            Non-farm group  Dummy  0.211  0.44 
Constant    -1.436  -1.28 
Total  of observation  99     
Observation with dependent =0  58     
% Correctly predicted  72.73     
Wald chi2(23)  44.72     
Prob > chi2  0.009     
Pseudo R2  0.3315     
Log pseudo-likelihood   45.64     
Source: Own calculation from IFPRI/RDD survey 1999 
Note: * P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01 , 